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ABSTRACT
This paper ties together several anthropological and
naturphilosophische themes in Hegel in order to re-examine the
place of the philosophy of nature in the Encyclopedia. By taking
Hegel’s anthropology as a starting point, I argue that his
philosophy of nature has for its subject not nature “as such,” but
nature as cognized by Geist, so that the identity of these two
natures is only constructed by spirit itself retroactively. I trace the
origin of this difference to the revolutionary event that institutes
Hegel’s anthropology – which is not a transition from nature to
spirit, but a pure break or new beginning, culminating in the
creation of the conceptual world of nature as “we” (philosophers
of nature) know it. As a result, the philosophy of nature does not
precede, but follows from, the anthropology and the philosophy
of spirit; the natural foundation is retroactively replaced by the





Where does Hegel’s philosophy of nature begin? This paper is an attempt at an analysis
of that apparently very simple question by means of an anthropological “reverse engin-
eering” of the philosophy of nature’s place in Hegel’s system. As we will see, the ques-
tion of the beginning of the philosophy of nature and, as a consequence, its place
within the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences leads to a significant recognition:
whereas in Schelling, Naturphilosophie has to do directly with the real, Hegel’s philos-
ophy of nature has for its subject not nature “as such,” but rather a new, “spiritual”
nature, nature as cognized by Geist; the narrative of the identity of these two
natures is not something given, but something constructed by spirit itself, retroactively.
The origin of this difference between nature-as-it-is and nature-as-spirit can be traced,
I will argue, to the revolutionary event that takes place at the very outset of the phil-
osophy of spirit and institutes Hegel’s anthropology, namely, his doctrine of the human
soul and its exposition in the first section of the philosophy of spirit, which at once fills
and maintains the gap between the real and the spiritual. The anthropology culminates
for Hegel in the birth of consciousness and the creation of a philosophical “nature,”
first as an “external” world of objects and then as the conceptual world of nature as
“we” (that is, philosophers of nature) know it. The philosophy of nature’s “nature”
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is essentially human nature, whereas nature-as-the-real remains, as a consequence, a
non-place relegated to the margins of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie, which the philosopher
replaces instead with an anthropological foundation. The human is revolutionary for
Hegel, but nature as such is not – rather the human revolutionizes, among other
things, the natural status quo itself. The philosophy of nature is also a product of
this revolution.
Revolution
There is, I believe, a tension in Hegel’s system between the philosophy of nature and the
philosophy of spirit, leading to two possible readings of their relationship, a “prospective”
one and a “retrospective” one. The “prospective” reading has been the standard since
Hegel himself placed the Philosophy of Nature as the second volume of the Encyclopedia,
coming after the Logic and before the Philosophy of Spirit. In this reading, there is a con-
tinuous logical progression from inorganic matter through the animal to the human soul
and then consciousness, so that between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of
spirit, the former is (onto)logically prior and transitions seamlessly into the latter, and phi-
losophically grounds it. Some have even, on the basis of such an assumption, spoken of
Hegel’s “materialism” with regard to the anthropology’s alleged origin in the philosophy
of nature (Žižek 2009, 107). Here, I’d like to question that logic by exploring the possibility
of the second, “retrospective” kind of reading, to suggest that perhaps we should read
Hegel’s Encyclopedia “backwards,” so we can see implications and assumptions inherent
in his Naturphilosophie that might otherwise remain unnoticed. In such a reading, the
philosophy of nature does not precede, but rather follows the anthropology, and the
latter’s transition into the phenomenology within the philosophy of subjective spirit,
taking its impetus from within the philosophy of spirit. Accordingly, the “prospective” nar-
rative itself, implied in Hegel’s placement of the Philosophy of Nature in the middle of the
system, is not the originary or absolute one, but a retroactive product of spirit and philo-
sophical knowledge; and if there is a “materialism” to Hegel’s thought of nature and spirit,
it is either materialism-as-embodiment or an implicit materialism of the real that remains
in the margins of the system, a philosophical non-place that allows the Hegelian speculat-
ive idealism to unfold.
Let us begin with the observation that, in a certain “Cartesian” sense which Hegel inher-
its, the philosophy of nature, as any philosophy, can only be done – within the Hegelian
framework – by spirit, be it absolute or finite (no matter how we understand the two,
whether theologically or purely anthropologically), so that the possibility of a Naturphilo-
sophie presupposes a certain pneumatology, or a “philosophy of spirit.” Indeed, a philos-
ophy of nature is, as part of philosophy in toto, a human endeavour; consider philosophy’s
place in the philosophy of absolute spirit, the crowning section of the Encyclopedia, which
has to do with the highest manifestations of human spiritual activity. However, for a phi-
losopher to think nature, to arrive at conceptual thinking at all, she must first, as an indi-
vidual, do so by means of a certain self-transformation; the path of this transformation is
that which the anthropology traces. As such, the philosophy of nature is as yet logically
impossible at the beginning of the anthropology, and remains so right until the human
individual becomes the thinking I of the phenomenology; Hegel refers to this event of
thinking as, at the same time, a “creation” of the cognizable natural world (Hegel 1994,
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137).1 It comes as no surprise, then, that Hegel tends to emphasize that it is Geist who cog-
nizes Natur, and moreover, that a “true” philosophy of nature, which we can, I believe,
identify with Hegel’s own philosophy of nature, can only begin when “we” approach
nature “geistig liebend” (Hegel 2007, 3), that is, “in a spiritually loving way” or “with spiri-
tual love.”This “love” is “spiritual” since it proceeds immanently from spirit and culminates
in a unity (that is, the philosophy of nature) that is spiritual and therefore immanent to
spirit. We can take this “pneumatology” from which the philosophy of nature begins to
mean either a theology (in which case we get nature as cognized by the absolute spirit) or
an anthropology (nature as cognized by the finite spirit); for Hegel, however, these two
options are essentially one and the same, because not only does the philosophy of subjective
spirit logically evolve into the philosophy of absolute spirit, but the former also has its begin-
ning in the absolute spirit’s activity so that Geist closes in on itself. Furthermore, for Hegel
the anthropology (as “spiritual”) is made logically possible by the Incarnation; it is in the
Christ-event that, as Hegel says, “the definition of spirit as this one” becomes possible
(Hegel 1970, 12:393). Thus the Incarnation becomes foundational for the entire anthropol-
ogy – to say that the philosophy of nature presupposes a theology, but not an anthropology,
could onlymean that it is written from the standpoint of the pre-IncarnationalGod,which is
to say from the standpoint of the past. There is, however, as we shall see, a very important
reason that this kind of statement is highly problematic in the systemic context of the Ency-
clopedia and the kind of theology that it implies.
As we can see by opening the third volume of the Encyclopedia, the philosophy of spirit
takes its beginning from the anthropology, from Hegel’s examination of the individual
human soul, which seems to pick up right where the philosophy of nature has ended.
Hegel’s own emphasis at the beginning of the anthropology, however, is inconsistent
with that kind of logic of continuity, insofar as he regards the anthropology as a new
beginning and not an evolution of that which ostensibly precedes it. The anthropology
begins, like almost everything in Hegel, with a negation. There are, of course, many
ways in which Hegel uses the term “negation,” but the one we encounter at the outset
of the anthropology is possibly the most radical and even revolutionary of them all. It
is, as Hegel puts it, the “absolute negativity” (§§381–382), an emergence that takes
place when an individual human body emerges from the body of the world, and when
an individual soul – individual power of sensation – is born, still “captivated” (§387Z.;
compare with §385Z.) by the sheer power of the world that Hegel calls the “world
soul” (§391), still “asleep” (§389), and yet already defined by an opposition to it. In
fact, the world soul does not for Hegel actually exist – it is only there as a virtual
“common substance” (§391); it is an excess of power that is “immaterial” (§389) only
insofar as it is virtual (thereby Hegel breaks away from any traditional notion of imma-
teriality), and “substantial” only insofar as it is foundational for any actual, singular soul-
body. It is a common virtuality from which every human soul is born. “Just as light shat-
ters into a countless multitude of stars, so the universal soul of nature, too,” states Hegel
(§390Z), “shatters into a countless multitude of individual souls – with the distinction
that, while light appears to have a persistent existence independent from the stars, the
1Most references to Hegel in this paper are either to the 3rd edition of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)
(Hegel 1970), designated by a paragraph number occasionally followed by “A.” to indicate an Anmerkung (note) or “Z.” to
indicate a Zusatz (addition) to the cited paragraph, as is standard in Hegel scholarship, or to Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die
Philosophie des Geistes (Hegel 1994). Translations are mine.
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universal soul of nature comes into actuality solely in the singular souls.” This virtual
“common substance,” continues Hegel in the next paragraph, “has its actual truth only
as singularity (Einzelheit)” (§391). Furthermore, since the soul is the first form of Geist
and since it cannot exist actually as the world soul, but only as a multitude of singular
soul-bodies, that means that Geist, too, has its first actual existence only as an anthropo-
logical multitude of embodied individualities, all born from within the world body. As the
first and most fundamental (“substantial”) form of spirit, the mode of its emergence as an
individual’s body, the anthropology is the embodied pre-reflectivity of Geist. These
anthropological points are pre-reflective and at the same time belong in the absolute;
self-reflection is not, in Hegel, an inextricable property of the absolute qua the absolute
beginning. This starting point is blind to itself and yet it is already Geist. And this is pre-
cisely the paradox: that spirituality is introduced by Hegel as a blind spot, an individual
blind spot belonging in the absolute, and therefore a blind spot of the absolute. In this,
Hegel goes beyond the Cartesian transparency of self-reflection.
The kind of negation that is the birth of a human soul is described by Hegel as a “saltus”
(1994, 52), a leap from Natur to Geist, rather than a seamless continuity – a leap to the
“immediate spirit” (§387; 1994, 30) that “must be grasped as spirit” (1994, 11; compare
with 1994, 3, 20, 30). In fact, the dividing line in the Encyclopedia between the Philosophy
of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit is not really a transition – which is the traditional
way of viewing it – but rather a pure difference, a hiatus between nature andGeist, between
the seemingly unchangeable status quo of nature and the possibility of new life and knowl-
edge. It is as if, in Hegel, the generative gap between the philosophy of nature and the phil-
osophy of spirit acted to suspend the natural order so as to inaugurate the radically new
“spiritual” one, related to the former as an “absolute negativity.” Even the most basic foun-
dation of human individuality, the “natural soul” (not to be confused with the “world soul”
as the “soul of nature”), has already left the original realm of nature “behind”; nature-as-
origin now “lies behind” it, says Hegel (§391; §391Z.). The soul has, of course, inherited
some of the natural changes and qualities, even as it has decisively broken away from
the world body, but those are now incorporated into a radically new whole where they
acquire, as Hegel puts it, a “spiritual meaning” (1994, 42, 45). The soul, that is, revolts
against their givenness, their “immediacy,” and aims to “idealize” (assimilate and trans-
form) them. Spirit, says Hegel in his lectures on the philosophy of history, can only
begin “from spirit”;2 as soon as a soul-as-body arises from nature, it ceases to be of
nature, becoming Geist, a materiality that is “spirit.” There is a striving, dubbed by
Hegel “a play of the absolute spirit with itself” (1994, 31) (to emphasize its independent,
objective character), on the part of an aspect of the world body to break away from its host
– Geist operating from within the real but not as part of it, bodily yet in revolt against the
world body. The absolute spirit thereby replaces nature as the real par excellence, the new
radically real, and Hegel’s anthropology becomes, in an important sense, a theory of revo-
lution, in which Geist determines itself as being-otherwise, an (unconscious) will towards
the new, a striving to be the “absolute negativity” and absolute newness against the
“natural” status quo.3 It is in this revolutionary act, for Hegel, that “spirit as this one” –
2Cited in Stederoth (2001, 106).
3This kind of anthropological revolution – as a new beginning as well as a revolt against or break from the natural status
quo – also invites comparison to Hegel’s account of revolution in his other works, from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the
Philosophy of Right and Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history. Here, too, the “new spirit” (Hegel 1970, 12:528)
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spirit as bodily singular – is born and shaped, and the locus of this struggle is precisely the
stratum of the human, the anthropological. Such is, incidentally, the (orthodoxly Hege-
lian) truth of all Left Hegelianism.
This revolution also has important consequences for Hegel’s philosophy of nature. In
particular, one should not be misled by his characterization of nature as “pointing
towards” or “bearing witness” to Geist (see, for example, §381Z.). Any such “pointing”
is only done retroactively by spirit itself which constructs a narrative – a “philosophy of
nature” – after the revolution has already taken place. Geist’s antagonistic relationship to
the totality of the real that it originally proceeds frommay, however, seem hard to recon-
cile with the injunction to approach nature “geistig liebend.” How do we build a true
philosophy of nature if nature is other to spirit and the latter emerges in a revolutionary
break from the former? How do we link together, on Hegel’s own terms, nature’s other-
ness and its immanence to spirit? One possible way of doing that hinges precisely on
reading the Encyclopedia in reverse, so that Hegel’s emphasis on nature’s “otherness”
to spirit (and the apparent dualism implied in that) finds its resolution in the fact
that it is only spirit who can philosophize about nature and unearth the concept
hidden within it, yet completely concealed from nature itself. Nature-as-it-is is wholly
other, but this otherness gets sublated as spirit gets to know and “idealize” the primordial
world body, to the point of mastering it completely and replacing the first nature with
the second, retroactively establishing their identity (in spirit). Hegel’s remark in §381
that Geist is “the absolutely first” with regard to nature means exactly that, and it is
in this important sense that the philosophy of spirit is prior to the philosophy of
nature, even though the former follows the latter within the architectonic of Hegel’s
system. In order to trace this different kind of path – not from nature to spirit, but
from spirit to nature – we need to consider, briefly, the underlying mechanism of the
anthropology itself, which establishes spirit’s birthright vis-à-vis nature. This mechan-
ism is that which Hegel terms “idealization,” creating not one but rather two
“natures” – nature-as-the-real (from which spirit revolts) and nature-as-spirit (which
spirit freely cognizes).
Idealization
Hegel defines Geist as, among other possible descriptions, an activity of “ideality,” Idea-
lität, or “idealization,” Idealisierung (see, for example, §381Z. or 1994, 30). Anthropo-
logically, it is this definition that, according to Hegel himself, matters the most
(§403A.), so that the entire logic of the anthropology, from the “world soul” and
“natural soul” to the “actual soul” and the transition to consciousness, turns out to
be a logic of idealization. When we hear the word “idealization,” we tend to associate
it with something abstract or incorporeal – however, that would be the opposite of
what Hegel means by the term. For him, idealization begins as soon as there is a
begins as an “absolute negativity,” or absolutely “negative” freedom (Philosophy of Right §5A.), over and against the old
regime. There are, however, no explicit connotations of death here – not until the beginning of the phenomenology,
where the abstract world of Verstand is described as that of “death” (Hegel 1994, 139). The anthropological revolution
is not abstract; it is, by contrast, a revolution of life. Similarly, the individual “spheres” that are destroyed by the French
Revolution (Hegel 1970, 3:433) are here, on the contrary, first constructed and defined (Hegel 1994, 55–58). A compara-
tive analysis of these accounts goes beyond the scope of this paper, but could, I believe, be illuminating.
COMPARATIVE AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 5
body (singled out from the flesh of the world – negation, as seen above), continues to
operate around (in the milieu of – assimilation), from within (Verleiblichung), and into
the body (Erinnerung), and leads to an individual embodied world (individuation), a
spiritually structured body that is for Hegel the anthropological subject (subjectivation).
At the culmination of this logic stands the notion of habit, or “second nature,” logically
followed by the birth of consciousness and the “external” nature which spirit begins to
cognize. This will prove instrumental in the anthropology’s significance for Naturphi-
losophie in Hegel.
A full explication of this anthropological logic would stray too far from the argument
of this paper, so let us only consider it briefly. For our purposes here, it is the assimila-
tory aspect of idealization that is the most important. Idealization as spirit’s revolt
against the immobility of the earth is at the same time a transformation of the earth.
All idealization begins as a saltus, an emergence on the surface of the world body
which immediately starts assimilating the area that surrounds it, constructing itself as
it attempts to retain itself (so as not to get lost within the flesh of the world again)
and even place itself at the centre. It is in this sense that Hegel speaks of “idealization,
or assimilation” (“Idealisierung oder Assimilation,” §381Z.). This is not, however, an
assimilation to anything pre-determined; rather, it is a transformation that determines
the form as well as the content of its operative agent itself, a construction (of a new
world) that is simultaneously a self-formation (towards a new kind of subjectivity).
Nor is it a purely “metaphorical” assimilation; it is, on the contrary, the agent’s body
and its material power that allows it to appropriate and construct its surroundings.
Whatever a newborn soul touches becomes part of itself, and vice versa: it defines its
“individuality” by the “totality,” Totalität, of the things it touches or digests, the
things it “fills” itself with (Erfüllung made actual, “posited” as a process of “subjectivity”
– “Es ist darum zu tun, daß es seine Substantialität, die nur an sich seiende Erfüllung als
Subjektivität setzt,” §403). The soul does not simply consume what it is offered; it is
always in the process of re-producing its own world (the “positing of nature as its
[that is, Geist’s] own world,” as Hegel defines it in §384). Ripped out of the world
body, a soul has to build for itself an “individual world,” “individuelle Welt” (§402Z.;
§407A.;1994, 66), by means of the double movement of idealization, in which it appro-
priates and assembles itself from just as it gives itself away to and imposes itself on the
surroundings. In this manner, idealization as assimilation defines itself for Hegel as sen-
sation, Empfindung.
Idealization is, in Hegel, an exchange between the soul-body and its environment, in
which an “inner” space of the “individual world” is being constructed and the “exteriority”
of the originary real is being “sublated” (§381Z. “sublation” here being another term for
“assimilation”). This exchange goes both ways – from within the soul-body as well as
towards and into it, designated by Hegel in §401 as Verleiblichung and Erinnerung respect-
ively. On the one hand, the soul can reach out to and “idealize” (that is, negate or retain) a
particular “immediate” (that is, given) sensation, relate it to itself and “make it internal”
(“innerlich gemacht,” §401), place it inside itself (Erinnerung) as yet another building
block of its inner world.4 On the other, the soul can reach inside its Fürsichsein (the
4Hegel plays here on the German word Erinnerung (usually translated as “recollection”), breaking it down into Er-innerung,
“internalization.” In this Er-innerung, the particular sensation in question is negated so that, according to the way Hegel
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soul’s innerness, always under construction) for a particular feeling – a memory of or a
reaction to a sensation (including such reactions as “anger, shame, laughter or tears,”
[Hegel 1994, 84]) – that it produces and enacts in its body or surroundings (Verleibli-
chung). “Pure corporeality is not sensation; it must erinnern itself, and vice versa, the
purely inner must verleiblichen itself” (1994, 86; compare with 1994, 131). Whatever
comes from within the soul, Hegel insists, must be verleiblicht so that the soul can
sense or “discover” it (“in order to be sensed, this content must be verleiblicht,” (1994,
84) – it must become a part of the soul-body and its surroundings that are thereby influ-
enced and transformed. This transformation goes both ways since not just Verleiblichung
but Erinnerung, too, involves an “appropriation” of the “natural” aspect of the soul’s
environment, so that the inner becomes the outer and the outer becomes the inner in a
circular dynamic of their mutual constitution. In the double movement of Verleiblichung
and Erinnerung, the “natural” is “idealized” towards the “posited totality of its [that is, the
soul’s] particular world” (§403A.) that includes both the “inner” world of the soul’s being-
for-itself (Fürsichsein) and, more importantly for us, the “outer” world of its surroundings,
so that the soul, as Hegel indicates, does not distinguish what rises from within itself and
what comes to it from without (“so that,” says Hegel, “we have the unity of the inner and
the outer, i.e. sensation,”(1994, 131; compare with 1994, 71, 88). Both belong equally to the
world that spirit feels is its own. The movement of constant repetition and reaffirmation of
the soul, the reciprocal constitution of the “individual world,” does not yet create a distinc-
tion between subject and object, between the inner world and the external world of nature,
which first appears in consciousness (“It should be noted” says Hegel, “that there is yet no
distinction between subject and object in sensation, which first has its place in conscious-
ness,” [1994, 74]). At most, it may be said to draw a conceptual line between the “form” of
the soul’s activity (as “subjectivity of sensation,” §403) and the “content” of the individual
world that this activity constructs – which, however, bodily coincide (the activity in ques-
tion is, after all, the process of sensation or feeling, which can only be bodily) and co-con-
stitute each other.
The radical move on Hegel’s part is to identify, within the logic of the anthropological
idealization that he advances, the constitution of individuality and the constitution of sub-
jectivity. As we have seen, the idealization at work in Hegel’s anthropology creates, by
virtue of its very structure, an individual world to which the soul-body relates as to its
own. Anthropologically, then, idealization is at the same time individuation that starts
at the very beginning of the anthropology – it is our body that makes us individual
right from the outset, even logically prior to the activity of sensation (1994, 31–32) –
and unfolds until its very end (up to the “actual soul” as “das bei sich festgewordene Indi-
viduum”; 1994, 133). It is only through such an individuation, for Hegel, that Geist
becomes “for itself” (§385Z.) and the originary real becomes “idealized,” and it is this
process that he has in mind when speaking of the soul as a “microcosm” into which
the “macrocosm” of nature is “contracted” (“compressed,” zusammendrängt), thereby
losing its “exteriority” (§391Z.). By virtue of this “contraction,” performed by the activity
of sensation, a soul appropriates the nature that surrounds it into its own individual world.
wants us to understand negation in the note to §403, it is “virtually preserved even if it does not exist” (emphasis mine). It
is “virtually preserved” in the sense that there is always a “virtual” possibility that it might be produced again; it has
become assimilated and therefore no longer exists (independently) except “inside” the soul or, on the contrary, it is
yet to exist, to be brought forth from within the soul.
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At the same time, the cycle of idealization as Verleiblichung and Erinnerung also leads in
Hegel to the emergence of a distinct type of subjectivity proper to this anthropological
individuality – the “Subjektivität des Empfindens” that Hegel speaks of in §403 or, as
he further defines it starting from §407, the subjectivity of “self-feeling.” The more a
soul-body – initially just a singular area of the world body, a (non)-natural body captivated
by the natural world – appropriates its environment and bodily operations, the more it at
once gathers itself, focusing itself into a simple point from which it can reach the entire
circumference of its individual world and which contains, in a “wrapped up” (eingehüllte,
1994, 68) or “virtual” (§403A.) manner, “as the subject and central point (Mittelpunkt) of
all determinations of content” (§402Z.), the totality of the world that it has sensed and
thereby idealized.5 It is this subjectivity that transforms the dark primordial flesh of the
world, or the elusive nature-as-it-is, into something structured and “spiritual.” At the
same time, idealization is also a progress of the subject’s power over the world body,
and therefore the continuation of the original revolutionary struggle. “The individual,”
explains Hegel in the lectures, “takes his sensation back to himself,” gathers it into
himself as the “point” of “self-feeling” which exists “in itself” and in every singular sen-
sation alike (1994, 107–108).
Being a subjectivity, self-feeling must also have a form of knowledge appropriate to
itself; this form of knowledge is, of course, sensation. Geist for Hegel is knowledge in all
its various forms, and the soul is a form of Geist. And indeed, in sensation, the soul for
Hegel “advances to the actual singularity that is for itself ( für sich)” (§390Z.); that is, in
sensation, the soul advances to knowledge, which is for Hegel the foundation of all
further, conscious knowledge. The soul “is and will remain individuality throughout the
entire determination and mediation of consciousness which will be later posited within
it” (§403A.). Of course, this knowledge is not yet Wissen (scientific knowledge), and the
kind of familiarity with nature that it gives is not yet conceptually structured. However,
it is important that the knowledge produced by sensation is already mediated, not immedi-
ate,6 as well as that, as a subjectivity, the soul feels not only the individual but also “the
universal,” that is, the unified totality of the idealized world. “It seems,” says Hegel, “to
be a contradiction that the universal can be sensed”; this contradiction is, however,
resolved by the fact that this kind of felt universal has “the kind of content that has not
yet been developed [by the subject] to the point of division between the universal and
the singular, the subjective and the objective. From this standpoint, I am what I sense,
and I sense what I am” (§400Z.). Already at this point, nature is indistinguishable from
spirit. Understanding sensation as an active and not just passive form of knowledge
with a distinct kind of structure and a distinct kind of subjectivity is not just another
radical anthropological move on Hegel’s part; it also proves important for the possibility
of Naturphilosophie. Namely, it makes evident that even the first form of spirit’s knowl-
edge, that is, sensation, produces not knowledge of nature as it is but nature as cognized
by (this pre-reflective form of) spirit. Even in sensation, which already implies a structured
5See also Hegel (1994, 74, 88, 131).
6The knowledge that corresponds to this (active, not passive) subjectivity is mediated through the structure of sensation as
Verleiblichung-Erinnerung. Hence Hegel’s insistence that the knowledge proper to the non-subject of Selbstgefül is not
dependent “on the immediate sensuous present” (§400Z.). However, in contrast to the knowledge proper to conscious-
ness, the subject of sensation never separates itself from what it feels – it is the kind of knowledge that never loses
contact with what it knows, being the “determinacy of my entire Fürsichsein” (§400A.). As a consequence, sensation
cannot serve as the basis for the philosophy of nature, whereas consciousness can.
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subjectivity, we do not have access to the originary nature from which spirit revolts at the
beginning of the anthropology. And that is why the anthropology not only fills, but also
maintains the revolutionary gap between “nature” and “spirit.”
Two natures
The anthropological process of idealization culminates for Hegel in two things: habit and
consciousness. Habit is its logical conclusion, idealization as developed to the fullest, while
consciousness is its telos; both are the highest point of spirit’s abstraction from nature,
leading in its turn to spirit’s abstraction from itself. Habit, Hegel writes in §409A., is “cor-
poreity reduced to its pure ideality.” In habit, “the soul is in possession of its content and
contains it within itself in such a way that within these determinations [of content] it does
not act as sensing, does not distinguish itself from them in relation to them nor is engulfed
in them, but…moves [freely] within them.” Habit makes the soul indifferent to these
determinations and therefore “free” of them (§410), so that the anthropological subject
does not get stuck in any particular determination anymore. Just like the subjectivity of
Selbstgefühl, habit has the structure of a “repetition”; it comes as no surprise, then, that
Hegel calls habit “the mechanism of self-feeling” (§410A.). Whereas the repetition charac-
teristic of Selbstgefühl consisted in the structured re-production of individuality and the
individual world, habit is presented by Hegel as the next step in this anthropological ideal-
ization – an anti-individual repetition meant to erase all possibility of self-feeling getting
lost in anything particular and to open it up to a universal spiritual world. Here, the trans-
formation of the world body into spiritual subjectivity has reached the point of indiffer-
ence towards the real (in contrast to the initial revolt against it). Instead of “cultivating
the real so that it is once more able to enter into a relation of indifference with the
ideal” (Whistler 2013, 219), as Schelling does, Hegel chooses to cultivate the revolutionary
ideal to a point of its becoming indifferent to the originary real – not only in habit, but also
in the subject-object structure of consciousness and in the philosophy of nature, which
builds upon the former.
Thanks to habit, “the soul is open for further activity and engagement, open for sen-
sation as well as for consciousness” (§410). Paradoxically, for Hegel this universalization
goes through the anthropological individualization, both encompassed under the term
“idealization” – an assimilation of the world which leads to its spiritualization so that it
may be cognizable. The highest form of this spiritualization is what Hegel calls the
“actual soul,” the fully formed individual subject ready to become the subject of knowl-
edge. In habit, spirit establishes a “second nature” (§410Z.) that has fully separated
itself from and against the world body (which we may call the “first nature”) from
which the anthropology revolted. This separation of second nature from the first continues
in the transition from soul to consciousness, that is, from the anthropology to the phe-
nomenology. The next step, after idealizing the body, is for Hegel to idealize the soul –
that is, negate it or abstract from it. In this idealization, consciousness starts relating to
the world that the soul has idealized as to something external: “the I excludes” the totality
of the soul and turns it into an “object” that it relates to as to an “external” world (§412),
asserting itself as an “empty” and “pure” subject. “The pure abstract freedom for itself
releases its determinacy, the natural life of the soul, as similarly free, as an independent
object, and it is this object as external to it that the I knows in the first place, thereby
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becoming consciousness” (§413). In the anthropology, spirit was as one with its world,
assimilated it without differentiating between the “inside” and the “outside”; in the phe-
nomenology, spirit separates the anthropologically idealized world from itself, becoming
a subject which has the “external” world of nature as its object (§413). Whereas the anthro-
pological logic of idealization was that of internalization, the phenomenology begins, on
the contrary, with an act of externalization.
For Hegel, consciousness is born as soon as the soul begins to consider the content of
sensation as something belonging not to itself, but to a nature that is outside and other to
spirit. Previously, Geist was blind and incapable of separating itself from its world (“I am
what I sense, and I sense what I am,” §400Z.); now it can distance itself from the natural
world and can therefore begin to think it through. The natural world it can cognize from
this point is not, however, nature-as-it-is, but nature-as-spirit; the phenomenological div-
ision proceeds for Hegel from within the soul, and therefore from the idealized “spiritual”
nature, the “second nature” which has reached its peak in habit. As a for-itself, the anthro-
pological subjectivity, having begun from immediacy and indistinction, now “exists for
itself in distinction from other [things that surround it]” (Hegel 1994, 76); it is on this
that the phenomenology builds. Metaphorically, Hegel describes this process in terms
of the soul “excluding” its own “content,” that is, the felt world of the anthropology,
and “positing” it “outside” itself, transforming it into an “external world” and thereby
becoming the I of consciousness (1994, 141). Here, cognizability has finally been achieved
and now spirit can approach its own world conceptually, which, coincidentally, forms the
basis for the philosophy of nature. “[The soul] freely releases its immediacy from within
itself… and this excluded external is in its totality the world” (1994, 137; compare with
1994, 141). That is why Hegel calls the transition from the anthropology to the phenom-
enology an “act of creation” (1994, 137): it creates the “external nature” as cognized by
spirit, the “spiritual” nature as distinct from the primordial nature-as-the-real from
whose depths the human soul emerged.
“This totality – the soul – is the content of that which is contained in the consciousness
of the I” (Hegel 1994, 142). Spirit is capable of immanently loving nature (approaching it
“geistig liebend”) because the nature that it loves is already immanently defined by spirit in
the course of the anthropology; Hegel’s Naturphilosophie, being already grounded in the
philosophy of spirit, has the third volume of the Encyclopedia for its presupposition. There
can be no philosophy of nature prior to that moment; there can, of course, be a nature
without the human, but not a philosophy of nature. The nature-as-we-know-it is the
human soul brought outside itself, so that our relation to nature is, in its origin, our
relation to our own soul. The natural, says Hegel, “is external, but on the other hand I
am it” (1994, 93). In fact, we may say that there are in Hegel not just two, but three
“natures.” The first nature is the world body from which spirit revolts; the second one
is human nature culminating in habit; and finally, the third nature is the subject matter
of the Philosophy of Nature, which has its origin in the transition from the anthropology
to the phenomenology. The “spiritual” nature, in other words, itself splits in two – into
“human nature” and “external nature” (as cognized by consciousness). As the develop-
ment from habit to consciousness in the philosophy of subjective spirit demonstrates,
these two natures are continuous between themselves but not with the nature from
which Geist proceeds in the revolutionary saltus. Nature-as-it-is cannot as such serve as
proper subject for the philosophy of nature because the latter deals only with nature-as-
10 K. CHEPURIN
it-is-explicated-by-spirit. That is why, after suggesting that a true philosophy of nature
would approach nature “geistig liebend,” Hegel also remarks that “the highest foundation
of such a study of nature lies within the human” (Hegel 2002, 6).
The philosophy of nature’s “nature” is, in other words, that which consciousness sees (or
produces) when it looks back at its own origin. Spirit “loves” nature, however, not as the
origin from which it comes, but as the revolutionary reshaping of the origin that it under-
takes, so that nature’s “otherness” becomes here its otherness to itself, a gap between the two
natures – the nature-as-origin and the nature-as-spirit, the latter posited as the “new” world
of nature (new “creation”) which displaces the old. Traditionally, nature’s otherness-to-itself
in Hegel has been understood to mean its scatteredness and blind contingency. That is, of
course, correct, but there is also a deeper meaning to it: nature’s otherness to itself, its alien-
ation from itself points to the gap between nature-as-origin and nature-as-spirit. This other-
ness is not a “beyond”; it is an immanent attempt by spirit to reconstruct its own origin.
Hence the two natures, and not just one; and hence why the relationship between these
two natures is not a dualism in the traditional sense – not a dualism within the system, at
least, and arguably not even a dualism at all. At the same time, since there is no dualism
between them is also why the overcoming of the Cartesian subject-object divide in the phe-
nomenology is highly important for the possibility of the true philosophy of nature. The
transition from soul to consciousness marks the beginning of Naturphilosophie, but at the
same time it is merely a beginning; the phenomenological consciousness, the I, is at first
completely “abstract” (the soul has transformed itself by means of abstracting from itself)
and therefore cannot yet approach nature “spiritually” in the full sense. “Consciousness,”
writes Hegel, “does not yet know that the object is in itself identical to spirit and it is only
through a self-division of spirit that it is seen as fully independent” (§414Z.). The “second
nature” is born first in habit and then in the transition from the anthropology to the phe-
nomenology, coinciding with the birth of consciousness; but in order for nature’s otherness
to be overcome, the subject-object divide must be overcome, too, and the logic of the phe-
nomenology is nothing other than that of spirit’s progressive knowledge of the external
world and the latter’s transformation into something “philosophical.” Logically prior to
the phenomenology, however, no philosophy of nature is possible. In a certain ontoanthro-
pological sense, for Hegel, the human does not proceed from the natural, but rather, the
natural proceeds from the human. There can be no philosophical knowledge of nature-
in-the-first-instance, or nature-as-origin, but only nature-in-the-last-instance, or nature-
as-spirit.
Conclusion: a Utopian perspective
Thanks to the anthropological idealization, spirit has its own, assimilated world, or even a
multitude of such worlds, just as there are a multitude of individual souls. It is not just that
spirit does not need the first nature (the world body) anymore – saying so would simplify
the logic that results from this anthropological reading of Hegel’s philosophy of nature.
Spirit does need to go “back” to the world body if it wants to have a validNaturphilosophie,
but it does so in a rather peculiar way. That is, the Schellingian real becomes redundant for
Hegel because the soul splits up from the world body as part of the world body; the anthro-
pological idealization revolts against the real by transforming it from the inside (what
Hegel calls “freedom from and within the natural,” [1994, 19]). This revolt establishes
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the anthropology’s significance as both the point of contact with the world body and that
of its assimilation by the soul’s being-for-itself. As a result, the soul still, in a sense, carries
the real “inside” itself even as it revolutionarily transforms it – and most importantly, it is
therefore only with itself, and not with the originary real, that it feels bound to join back.
Even the materiality of nature is only cognizable, in this reading, via the materiality of
Geist, that is, sensation as property of the soul-body – hence the emphasis on gnōthi
seauton that we find throughout Hegel’s philosophy; and hence also the important
utopian character of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, and, as a consequence, Hegel’s philos-
ophy of nature as well. Namely, the conceptual genesis of the absolute in Hegel’s Encyclo-
pedia necessitates the reverse movement of the real, from the third volume of the
Encyclopedia to the second. In an important sense, the philosophy of spirit begins for
Hegel, literally, from nowhere – nature-as-it-is remains a non-place within the system,
one from which the human revolts and which it no longer theorizes as such. The entirety
of the anthropology and the phenomenology is, in fact, spirit’s attempt to “idealize,” or
“assimilate,” the originary non-place, to come to grips and join back with the real – not
the real as it is, but the real as already assimilated by spirit. Catherine Malabou speaks,
albeit in a different sense, of spirit’s “reduplication” of nature in Hegel’s anthropology
(Malabou 2005, 26). At stake here is, however, something more than a “reduplication”;
it is essentially a joining back as a replacement.7 Or, if we are to talk about this process
in terms of a “reduplication,” it is not, as per Malabou, spirit that reduplicates nature –
it is (the philosophy of nature’s) nature that is a reduplication of spirit and as spirit.
Geist strives to replace the first-order utopia of the real with a new, spiritual nature,
and to take it under control, but since the first nature remains non-theorizable as such,
the gap cannot be fully closed and spirit’s revolutionary project itself remains utopian.8
From this perspective, the philosophy of spirit may be viewed as an attempt to bridge
the revolutionary gap by building a spiritual non-place (a second-order utopia) on top
of the non-place of the real (the first-order utopia), which begins from the anthropological
revolution, the anthropological point – Hegel calls it the “intensive form of individuality”
(§405A.) – which is pre-reflective and yet already spiritual. The rupture with the natural
which institutes Hegel’s Anthropology is already an event ofGeist, even though it is not yet
the event, not yet the universal actuality of the kingdom of spirit. The revolutionary power
of the origin dictates that the old (that is, nature) proceeds from the new (that is, spirit)
and comes after the fact of the new, and not the other way around; at the standpoint of
the past there are no conditions for a true philosophy of nature.9 Nature’s past is therefore
always written from the standpoint of spirit’s future. It is the concrete reality of Geist that
unfolds back into the philosophy of nature; it is the new – the actuality of the new – which
retroactively unfolds into the past. The nature of the philosophy of nature is, as it were,
7With regard to the gap between nature and spirit, it should also be noted that, even though the logic of the philosophy of
nature presents an attempt to lead up to the human via the animal soul, it never actually achieves that goal. The animal
soul is for Hegel completely caught up in the endless digestive-reproductive cycle, the animal’s unity with the genus
being, according to Hegel, “the highest” that is available to it (Enz §§351Z., 356, 356Z., 369, 369Z.; compare with
Hegel 1994, 25–26).
8Naturally, this kind of utopian character of Hegel’s system also entails important political and theological consequences.
These go beyond the scope of this paper, but I hope to explore them in my future work.
9This is also why, as pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the philosophy of nature cannot be written as if seen
through the eyes of the pre-Incarnational God (that is, before the human and the anthropological) – giving further
meaning to Hegel’s characterization of nature as “other” to the Logic, that is, to “God the Father” (see O’Regan 1994).
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post-thinkable, but never pre-thinkable. This post-thinkability itself, however, only arrives
in the wake of the revolution that first makes the immanent construction of the nature-
narrative possible, the event of the new that gives birth to a “philosophical” nature.
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